Alliance capabilities and relational capital : an integrated perspective by Ziggers, G.W. & Duysters, G.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/19490
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES ON 
RESEARCH IN RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
Alliance Capabilities and Relational Capital: 
An Integrated Perspective 
 
Gerrit W. Ziggers and Geert Duysters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES ON RESEARCH IN RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 
Reference number RRM-2004-03-STR 
Publication status / version January 2004 
Email address contact author g.ziggers@nsm.kun.nl 
URL (electronic version) http://www.nsm.kun.nl 
Address Nijmegen School of Management 
University of Nijmegen 
Thomas van Aquinostraat 1 
P.O. Box 9108 
6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Phone: +31 (0)24 361 14 07 
Fax: +31 (0)24 361 19 33 
. 
  
Alliance Capabilities and Relational Capital: An Integrated Perspective 
 
Gerrit W. Ziggers*, Geert Duysters** 1 
 
 
 
* University of Nijmegen 
P.O. Box 9108 
6500 HK Nijmegen 
The Netherlands 
G.Ziggers@nsm.kun.nl  
 
** Eindhoven Centre for Innovation Studies (ECIS) 
P.O.Box 513 
5600 MB Eindhoven 
The Netherlands 
 
 
                                                          
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from KLICT 
. 
Alliance Capabilities and Relational Capital: An Integrated Perspective 
 
Abstract 
Over the past decades alliance activity among companies has reached unsurpassed levels. In spite of this strong 
increase in alliance activity, success rates of alliances have been surprisingly low. In this paper we study two 
main lines of research that aim to explain alliance performance; i.e. research that has stresses the role of trust and 
personal interaction in inter-organizational relationships and research that points at the role of alliance 
competence as a main driver of alliance success. More in particular, we focus on the interplay between a firm’s 
alliance capability and its relational capital. It is argued that relational capital and alliance capability are 
important constructs of alliance success. By studying the interrelations between these construct and their effect 
on alliance performance we are able to provide some important insights in how firms can manage their inter-
organizational relationships more effectively. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past two decades alliances have become one of the most important organizational 
forms, as shown by the fact that more than 20.000 alliances have been reported within a time 
frame of two years (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Alliances are often considered an important 
vehicle for value creation. (Chan et al., 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000).The rapid 
proliferation of alliances has become a cornerstone of competitive advantages for many 
organizations. Competition through cooperation has become a key element of a firm’s 
strategy to gain advantages and create value. As a result it has paved the way for the 
introduction of a new form of competition: group versus group rather than firm versus firm 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1994; 2000). Gomes-Casseres (2000) and Doz and Hamel (1998) have 
been among the first authors to point at the increasing frequency of collaboration as a 
reflection of a fundamental shift from the traditional form of competition (firm vs. firm) to a 
new form (group vs. group). Garcia-Pont (1992) postulates that an individual need for access 
to strategic resources, which are required for industry survival but not held by a single firm, 
will lead to new forms of alliances (strategic blocks). Such a collective strategic block of 
alliances represents an accumulation of those scarce and highly valued resources and 
capabilities which are accessible at both an individual and group level and which serve to tie 
individual firms in an industry into a much larger system of exchange (Garcia-Pont, 1992). 
Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven (2001) suggest that such competitive arrangements 
represent a new form of rivalry, in which firm-to-firm competition is superseded by group to 
group rivalry. 
 
. 
As firms increasingly attempt to access or absorb the capabilities of other firms, inter-firm 
alliances have become commonplace. An alliance can be defined as any independently 
initiated inter-firm link that involves exchange, sharing or co-development (see Gulati, 1995). 
Alliances can take many forms such as production agreements, marketing or distribution 
agreements, and technology exchange agreements. Furthermore, in a range of studies over the 
past twenty-five years the existence of tangible relationships between firms that are connected 
together to form a “quasi-organisation” has been observed (see i.e. Iacobucci, 1996: Laage 
Hellman, 1997; Ford et al., 1998; Sheth and Parvtiyar, 2000). These relationships are likely to 
be complex and have a long term orientation. Moreover, their current form is the outcome of 
previous interactions. These alliances enable firms to cope with their increasing technological 
dependence on others and the need to develop and tailor offerings to more specific 
requirements. Technologies are both developed and exploited within them (Lundgren, 1995; 
Ford and Saren, 1996). Although alliances have become a popular organizational form for 
accessing resources, they frequently fail to live up to expectations. Studies by Bleeke and 
Ernst (1993), Harrigan (1985), Kogut (1989) and Anderson Consulting (Alliance Analyst, 
1998) report failure rates of 50%, 54% and 53% respectively. Previous research suggests that 
alliance failure can be attributed to a diversity of factors. Among the most frequently 
addressed factors are; a lack of strategic fit in terms of complementary resources (Harrigan, 
19985), lack of organizational fit in terms of compatible cultures, decision-making processes 
and systems (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000), lack of trust (Arino and De la Torre, 1998), 
inappropriate choice of governance structure (Williamson, 19985; Hennart, 1988), inability to 
manage conflict (Doz and Hamel, 1998), lack of adaptable inter-organizational exchange 
processes (Zajac and Olsen, 1993), impact of sudden major environmental shocks (Mitchell 
and Singh, 1996). Taken together, these studies indicate that alliance success is difficult to 
achieve. Thus while alliance can create economic value and are a mean for competition, they 
are also fraught with risk. Therefore, understanding what firms can do to enhance the 
probability of success is an intriguing and important question for both managers and alliance 
researchers alike. 
 
An important body of literature in alliance research (e.g. Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Dwyer et 
al., 1987) argues that trust plays a central role in relationship building and maintenance, 
thereby contributing to the probability of alliance success. Trust leads to co-operative 
behaviour that is conducive to alliance success. The alliance between Wal-Mart and 
Procter&Gamble in the United States is a typical example of the power of trust in 
. 
transforming channel relationships and in unleashing the benefits of partnerships (Kumar, 
1996). Similarly, in Europe, Albert Heijn and Heineken, as well as Marks & Spencer and its 
suppliers have developed relationships based on mutual trust (Geyskens et al. 1998). Trust is 
considered as an essential ingredient for such relationships to realize their full potential. 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) presented a ‘key mediating variable’ model in which trust is 
positioned as a key variable, mediating the relations between important antecedents (e.g. 
communication) and consequences (e.g. conflict). The mediating role of trust is also implicit 
in other studies, examining the relation between various antecedents and consequences (e.g.  
Ganesan, 1994; Anderson and Narus, 1990). These studies do not suggest that trust accounts 
for the total effect of antecedents on relationship consequences, but that trust acts as an 
important mediator. (Geyskens et al, 1998). Critical to establishing the key role of trust in 
affecting important relationship outcomes (such as satisfaction and commitment) is to rule out 
other explanations. According to Geyskens et al. (1998) behavioural processes involving trust 
are crucial to understand co-operative relationship building and are certainly not redundant 
once its antecedents, and more in particular economic outcomes are taken into account. The 
importance of issues such as trust, but also friendship and respect, is often referred to as 
relational capital (Coleman, 1990).  
 
The insights generated by these types of studies refer mainly to critical aspects in the dyadic 
relationship, but have been unable to assess the factors that determine performance across a 
portfolio of alliances (Kale and Singh, 1999; Duysters et al., 1999). As a consequence, in spite 
of their important contributions these studies are unable to explain the reported fixed-firm 
effects in individual firm’s alliance performance (Duysters and Heimeriks, 2002). In more 
recent work other theoretical perspectives, e.g. evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Lewin and Volberda, 1999), organizational learning and knowledge based theory 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996), resource based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991; Das and Teng, 2000), have been used to deal with this omission in the traditional 
literature. These theories point to organizational capabilities rather than to dyadic and 
relational characteristics in order to explain alliance success. From these perspectives 
previous research suggests that one of the most important determinants of alliance success 
(and on a firm’s ability to form new alliances) is prior and/or ongoing alliance experience 
(Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Child and Yan, 1999). Simonin (1997) found that greater alliance 
experience is linked with firms ‘abilities to effectively select alliance partners and to manage 
conflict. More recently, Anand and Khanna (2000) found that firms with greater prior alliance 
. 
experience generate significantly higher stock market returns from alliance announcements 
than firms without alliance experience. They claim that firms learn to create more value as 
they accumulate experience in joint venturing. Even in the context of the same set of partners, 
some studies suggest that repeated tie arrangements by allying with the same partner helps the 
partnering companies in future alliances. Presumably, prior experience of this kind increases 
the success of future alliances with the same partners for several reasons. First of all, the firm 
in question may have greater commitment to make the alliance work given the trust among 
partners. Furthermore prior experience helps firms to effectively build partner-specific 
routines of coordinating resources and tasks (Kale et al. 2002). The implicit assumption 
behind the relationship between the presence of an alliance capability and success is that there 
are learning effects that enable firms to develop relational capital (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In 
the area of alliances, Hewlett-Packard, Corning and Coca-Cola have been described as firms 
that have been particularly successful at developing and managing alliances (Alliance 
Analyst, 1996: Harbinson and Pekar1998; Kale and Singh, 1999). Anecdotal data and case-
based studies have also provided support for the argument that some firms learn how to 
develop and manage alliances more effectively than others (Alliance Analyst, 1996, Dyer, 
1996). 
 
Although there have been ample studies on the central role of relational capital in alliances at 
the dyadic level (e.g. Geyskens et al, 1998; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Dwyer et al., 1987) and more recently on the role of alliance capability (e.g. Kale et al, 
2002, Lambe et al., 2002; Anand and Khanna, 2000) at the firm level, an integrative approach 
providing insight to the critical aspects in the dyadic relationship, the fixed firm’s effect and 
their interrelationship in alliance success is needed. An individual firm’s ability to work 
effectively with other firms may be classified as a firm specific capability (which may 
generate relational rents), however there is value in distinguishing a relational capital view, 
which offers a distinct, but complementary, view on how firms generate rents. A relational 
capital view considers the dyad/network as unit of analysis and the rents that are generated to 
be associated with the dyad/network. A firm’s specific capability focuses on how individual 
firms generate supernormal returns based upon resources, assets and capabilities that are 
housed within the firm. However, according to a relational capital perspective, rents are 
jointly generated and owned by partnering firms. Thus, relational rents are the property of the 
dyad or network. A firm in isolation, irrespective of its capabilities or resources can not enjoy 
these rents. (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Besides, these relational rents offer allying firms to gain 
. 
competitive advantage. Thus, on one hand an alliance capability is not a sufficient condition 
for realizing relational rents, on the other hand it is a prerequisite for realizing relational 
capital.This implies also that an analysis either on the level of the individual firms, dyad or 
network will fail to produce an understanding of the nature of competition shaping the 
industry.  Instead competitive advantage must be understood as ‘not only the result of firm 
based characteristics but also as the features of the alliances or network to which the firm 
belongs’ (Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001). As Zajac and Olsen (1993) have argued, 
all parties use inter-organizational strategy to establish an ongoing relationship that can create 
value that could otherwise not be created by either firm independently. As a consequence 
alliance success itself can be considered as a three level construct, that includes a firm level 
success (the extent to which a firm has access to an other firm’s resources), an alliance level 
success (the extent to which allying firms have effectuated their joint objectives) and industry 
level alliance success (the extent to which the alliance has succeeded to increase its 
competitiveness or attractiveness). The interplay of both alliance capital and relational capital 
and their impact on alliance success has not widely been discussed previously in the literature. 
Therefore the primary purpose of this study is to examine the impact of a firm-level alliance 
capability and a dyadic/ level relational capital on alliance success. In the following sections 
the main conceptual arguments of alliance capability and relational capital are discussed on 
the basis of a review of the relevant academic literature. Finally implications are discussed in 
the perspective of the firm, alliance and network level as well as directions for future research. 
 
2. Alliance capability and alliance success 
Effective alliance management is of eminent importance. However, the ex-ante structuring of 
alliances is important as well. This is reflected in the extensive literature on topics such as 
partner selection and characteristics (e.g. Parkhe 1993, Geringer, 1991), performance effects 
of ownership and control (e.g. Geringer and Herbert, 1989; Beamish 1985). The underlying 
premise of these studies is that choosing the appropriate partner, aligning strategic and 
economic incentives of the partner firms and using ownership control have proven to be 
critical determinants of alliance success, and have been shown to mitigate the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour (Aulakh et al. 1996). Researchers argue that both relational factors 
(e.g. trust, commitment and satisfaction) and non-relational resources (e.g. complementary 
and idiosyncratic) contribute to partnership success.  However this does not reveal how 
alliances successfully acquire and create the complementary and idiosyncratic resources that 
facilitate competitive advantage and superior (financial) performance. Moreover, it lacks a 
. 
sufficient understanding of the ability for finding developing and managing alliances: an 
alliance capability (Lambe et al., 2002). 
 
Evidence suggests that there may be systematic differences in the co-operative capabilities 
that firms build up as they have more experience with alliances and that the extent of this 
learning may be an important indicator of the relative success of those firms with alliances 
(Lyles, 1988). This poses questions about the specific nature of these capabilities and the 
systematic tactics firms use to internalise such capabilities. Some of these capabilities have 
already been reported in the literature; i.e. identifying valuable alliance opportunities and 
good partners, using appropriate governance mechanisms, developing inter-firm knowledge-
sharing routines, making requisite relationship-specific asset investments and initiating 
necessary changes to the partnership as it evolves while also managing partner expectations 
(Dyer and Singh, 1997; Doz, 1996) 
 
From a theoretical perspective the organisational learning, dynamic capabilities and 
evolutionary economics literature offer some of the most useful insights with regard to 
capability development, since capabilities often rest upon unique sources of knowledge (Kale 
et al. 2002). Organisational capabilities develop as a result of recombining and/or integrating 
knowledge within the firm. This knowledge is typically built through learning that involves 
making associations between a firm’s past actions, the effectiveness of those actions and 
future actions (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). According to Lambe et al. (2002) alliance capability has 
three main facets 1) alliance experience, 2) alliance manager development capability and 3) 
partner identification propensity. Experience with alliances is a resource that can be leveraged 
across an organisation, because it contributes to knowledge about how to manage and use 
alliances (Simonin, 1997). Day (1995) noted that such experience contributes to the quality of 
a firm‘s ‘alliance management’ by, among others, improving their abilities with respect to 
“selecting and negotiating with potential partners” and “planning the mechanics of the 
alliance so that roles and responsibilities are clear cut”. Much of the knowledge about finding, 
developing and managing alliances is “tacit” (Polanyi, 1996), and firms must learn by doing 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Day 1995; Spekman et al. 1999). As a consequence firms should 
expect some of their initial attempts to create alliances to fail. Thus, firms’ initial attempts 
should be focussed on relatively noncomplex alliances. More ambitious alliances can then be 
undertaken when experience builds over time (Spekman et al. 1999; Lambe and Spekman, 
1997). In this line of reasoning, one could argue that firms might hire external support to fill 
. 
the experience gap. However, recent findings of Duysters and Heimeriks (2002) show that 
external parties did not play a significant role in determining alliance success. They argue that 
distinctive competitive advantage cannot be distilled from the mere possession of certain 
mechanism. It requires the development of managerial capabilities as well as difficult-to-
imitate combinations of organisational, functional and technological skills. 
 
Day (1995) and Spekman et al (1996) suggest that firms with an alliance competence have the 
ability to develop capable alliance managers. These managers then enable firms to plan and 
navigate the mechanics of an alliance so that roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated 
and agreed upon. Simonin (1997) stated that the lower-than-average failure rate of joint 
ventures in the oil industry can be linked to the fact that managers have learned the essentials 
of collaboration. Lambe et al (2002) draw the conclusion that competent alliance managers 
will negotiate structure and operate alliances in ways that allow such firms to secure attractive 
alliance partners and to minimise the chances of alliance mismanagement such as poor 
conflict resolution. Furthermore, they will work with their partner firms on successfully 
combining and synthesising their complementary resources into idiosyncratic resources that 
may well lead to competitive advantage.  
 
Firms that have an alliance competence systematically and proactively scan and identify 
partners that have the complementary resources that are needed to “develop” a relationship 
portfolio or mix that complements existing competencies and enables them to occupy 
positions of competitive advantage (Hunt, 1997). Firms that can identify such partners not 
only enhance their ability to compete but also improve their chances of alliance success (Dyer 
and Singh 1998; Lambe et al, 2000; Simonin 1997; Sivadas and Dwyer 2002). In addition, 
Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995) and Day (1995) suggested that firms that scan for 
promising partners may also often achieve an alliance ‘first-mover’ advantage that allows 
them to gain access to and pre-empt competition from scarce resources offered by potential 
alliance partners. Day (1995) argues that a firm that is adept at identifying, consummating, 
and managing strategic alliances is likely to have first mover advantage in bringing the best 
candidates into the relationship.  
 
A study of Kale et al. (2002) indicates that when a firm makes an investment in a dedicated 
alliance function designed to capture and apply the know-how from its alliance experience, its 
alliance success rate increases. They found that a firm’s investment in a dedicated alliance 
. 
function is a more significant predictor of the firm’s overall alliance success experience than a 
firm’s alliance experience. If accounted for self-selection, the effect of alliance experience on 
alliance success diminishes. This result has important implications for prior research that has 
focused on alliance experience as an important explanatory of alliance capability and success. 
Kale et al. (2002) come to the conclusion that although alliance experience is important it 
seems to facilitate trough the creation of a dedicated structure to co-ordinate and leverage that 
experience more effectively. Having such a function can improve firms ‘ alliance abilities  so 
as to be able  to identify appropriate alliance partners, screen alliance partners more 
effectively, attract alliance partners that are stronger and more compatible, and eventually 
present and position the alliance more appropriately to the external world of customers, 
competitors and investors. Most alliance functions seem to capture and codify knowledge to 
more effectively manage each phase of the alliance life cycle, being 1) the initiating stage 
(e.g. making the business case), 2) the development stage (e.g. designing alliance governance 
structure) an 3) the maturity stage (e.g. relationship evaluation) (see also figure 1). 
 
Organisational experience with alliances contributes to a firm’s knowledge of how to 
successfully form and implement alliances (Simonin 1997; Spekman et al 1999). Firms 
having such experience will improve their ability to select, negotiate and structure alliances so 
that they can secure alliance partners that have complementary resources (Spekman et al. 
1999; Day 1995). An alliance competence implies that a firm produces capable alliance 
managers, it facilitates the ability of such firms to select and secure alliance partners that have 
complementary resources because alliance managers are often involved in initial negotiating 
and structuring of alliances (Spekman et al. 1999). An alliance competence will have a 
positive effect on complementary resources because it enhances the competency to identify 
potential alliance partners with complementary resources (Sivadas and Dwyer 2000; Spekman 
et all 1999; Dyer and Singh 1998, Simonin 1997). Lambe et al. (2002) conclude that an 
alliance competence is a key antecedent to complementary resources, idiosyncratic resources 
and alliance success. An alliance competence allows firms to acquire and combine their most 
basic resource advantage in a fashion that contributes to alliance success. This is considered to 
be an important finding that is likely to assist firms that wish to better understand the drivers 
of alliance success. In addition, identifying an alliance competence as a key antecedent of 
alliance success, is critical to study alliances because it contributes to a more complete 
explanation of  its success 
 
. 
To summarize, a firm’s alliance capability is conceptualised as an organisational ability for 
finding suitable partners and developing and managing alliances. Furthermore, if all partners 
in an alliance have an alliance capability (joint alliance capability) then they will work 
together more effectively then in an alliance where an asymmetric or unbalanced alliance 
competence exists. In other words an unskilled alliance partner can diminish the ability of the 
alliance partners to work together and make necessary resource investments in the alliance to 
create alliance value. For example, a firm, even one with a high degree of alliance 
competence, will have problems working with an alliance partner that cannot manage inter-
firm cultural differences. Hence, it is likely to have difficulties co-ordinating activities with 
another firm, sharing control, and face problems in information sharing and the ability to 
attract the necessary investments in the alliance (Lambe et al. 2002; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000; 
Spekman et al. 1999). Hence, although it might be argued that one competent alliance partner 
can have a positive effect on the other, research indicates that the know-how required to be a 
competent alliance partner is complex and requires years of alliance experience (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Spekman et al, 1999; Lambe and Spekman, 1997; Simonin 1997; Day 1995). 
When all of the firms in an alliance have an alliance competence, there is a synergistic benefit 
that enhances the ability to the alliance to work together and to create value (Lambe et al. 
2002). This might eventually lead to a more competitive position as a group of allying firms 
(see also figure 1). 
 
3. Relational capital and alliance success 
The alliance literature has focused extensively on partner opportunism and most researchers 
have adopted a transaction cost economics perspective in an attempt to deal with this 
particular aspect (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1991). Firms' 
concerns about opportunistic behavior by their partners are likely to lead to high transaction 
costs and it has been suggested that firms can adopt appropriate contractual agreements or 
governance structures to address these concerns. Using transaction cost economics, scholars 
have identified two sets of governance properties through which equity alliances can 
effectively alleviate the transaction costs involved. One is the property of a 'mutual hostage' 
situation, in which shared equity aligns the interests of the partners involved. Since partners 
are required to make ex ante commitments to equity alliances, their concern for their 
investments reduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior over the course of the alliance 
(Pisano, 1989). Second, in equity alliances, the investing partners create a hierarchical 
supervision not only to oversee the day-to-day functioning of the alliance, but also to address 
. 
contingencies as they arise (Kogut, 1988). Numerous researchers have criticized the 
transaction cost economics perspective on alliances for its singular focus on partner 
opportunism and its advocacy of the use of contractual agreements or equity to resolve it. This 
approach fails to capture an important element in alliance partnerships, namely the role of 
interfirm trust and the evolution of interpartner relationships (Gulati, 1995) 
 
'Trust' has been referred to in the literature in many different ways. First, it is considered 'a 
type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s exchange partner will act 
opportunistically' (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Offering a slightly different emphasis, Madhok 
(1995), suggests that trust between exchange partners has two components: a structural 
component which is fostered by a mutual hostage situation, and a behavioral component, 
which refers to the degree of confidence that individual partners have in the reliability and 
integrity of each other. Similarly, Gulati (1995) differentiates among knowledge-based trust 
and deterrence-based trust. Knowledge-based trust emerges between two firms as they 
interact with each other and learn about each other. Deterrence based trust is based on 
utilitarian considerations which lead a firm to believe that a partner will not engage in 
opportunistic behavior, owing to the costly sanctions that are likely to arise. Cullen (2000) 
differentiates credibility trust from benevolence trust, one rational and the other emotional 
(Kramer, 1999; Moorman et al. 1993). Credibility trust, the rational component of trust, is the 
confidence that the partner has the intent and ability to meet their obligations and make their 
promised contributions to the alliance (Johnson et al. 1996). It concerns beliefs about whether 
or not a partner can really deliver what they promise. Benevolent trust is the belief that an 
alliance partner will behave with goodwill toward the alliance and the partners (Johnson et al, 
1996). Benevolence is the subjective or emotional side of trust. It refers to one’s beliefs 
regarding a partner’s caring about the relationship. Overall, there is an emerging consensus 
among alliance scholars that mutual trust creates the basis for an enduring and effective 
relationship between contracting firms. For example, Gulati (1995) shows how trust enables 
firms to reduce dependence on equity structures to govern the relationships. Zaheer et al., 
(1998) demonstrate how trust reduces negotiating costs in alliances and also enhances alliance 
performance. Trust between organizations has often been conceived as the agglomeration of 
trust between individuals in the organizations. 
 
Numerous examples highlight the existence of stable obligatory relationships based on trust 
between individual members of the partnering firms. Accounts of the industrial districts in 
. 
Italy (Piore and Sabel, 1984), of subcontracting relationships in the Japanese textile industry 
(Dore, 1983), and those in the Japanese automobile industry (Dyer, 1996) highlight this 
aspect. The premise is that, as firms work with each other trust is built among individual 
members of the contracting firms because of the close personal ties that develop between 
them (Macaulay, 1963). Such trust is based upon close interaction and relationships that 
develop at the personal level. It is akin to the knowledge-based trust referred to by Gulati 
(1995) or the behavioral-based trust referred to by Madhok (1995). A history of close 
relationships helps individual members develop such trust in their counterparts in the 
partnering firm. Relational exchange theory (Dore, 1983) in economic sociology also 
discusses how personal relationships based on trust arise and exist between firms. Palay 
(1985) and Ring and Van de Ven (1992) have also pointed out the important role of personal 
connections and relationships between contracting firms. The combination of mutual trust, 
friendship and respect is often referred to as relational capital. Relational capital in the 
alliance is considered as the quality of the relationship that exists between social actors 
(Coleman, 1990). Relational capital consists of the socio-psychological aspects of the 
alliance, more specifically those socio-psychological aspects that are positive and beneficial 
to the alliance. It involves the pattern of interaction between partner firms that facilitates and 
allows for the effective functioning of the alliance on a day to day basis. It is through 
relational capital that the alliance is actually enacted and implemented. Relational capital 
involves having alliance partners attend to and invest time and effort toward building positive 
feelings and interaction patterns in the alliance relationship. Although often ignored 
completely or subordinated as secondary to financial considerations, an alliance cannot 
optimise performance without adequate relational capital (Cullen et al, 2000). 
 
4. The role of relational capital in alliances 
An additional reason for relational capital being important in alliances is associated with the 
aspect of learning, often cited as one of the major benefits and motivations for alliances. 
Firms that wish to absorb critical information or know-how from their alliance partner must 
first understand where the relevant information or expertise resides in its partner and who 
possesses it (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Close personal interaction between the partnering 
entities enables individual members to develop this understanding. Learning or transfer of 
such know-how is then contingent upon the exchange environment and mechanisms that exist 
between the alliance partners. Know-how is generally more sticky, tacit, and more difficult to 
codify than information and thus more resistant to easy transfer, both within and across firms 
. 
(Szulanski, 1996). However, Von Hippel (1988) and Marsden (1990) have argued that close 
and intense interaction between individual members of the organizations involved acts as an 
effective mechanism to transfer or learn sticky and tacit know-how across the organizational 
interface. Learning success also rests upon an iterative process of exchange between the 
member firms and the extent to which personnel from the two firms has direct and intimate 
contact to facilitate an exchange (Arrow, 1974; Badaracco, 1991). A social exchange 
approach provides the basis for such interaction and exchange. Strong relational capital 
usually engenders close interaction between alliance partners. It can thus facilitate exchange 
and transfer of information and know-how across the alliance interface. 
 
The  concept of relational capital becomes even more complex and dynamic when viewed in 
terms of interactions and responses of partners to each other in the relationship, that is from 
the dyadic perspective rather than the individual firm ' s perspective. In this case, the issues 
involve mutual trust and mutual commitment. As in all business interactions, the building of 
trust and commitment depends on the partners' signaling to each other and the interpretation 
and response to this signaling in the relationship (Butler, 1991; 1995). Most experts who 
study business negotiations believe that trust in relationships, such as those between alliance 
partners, builds in through a feedback pattern called a "trust cycle" (Butler, 1995; Zand, 
1972). Just as individual people in personal relationships, partners in (strategic) alliances 
often feel vulnerable in the initial stages of the relationship (Neale & Bazerman, 1992). Firms 
often begin a relationship suspicious of each other's motives. This early vulnerability and 
suspicion makes partners tentative in their involvement in the relationship and reluctant to 
reveal true motives, business "know-how," or technology. For example, typical fears and 
questions include the following: Do they want to steal our technology? Are they trying to take 
us over? Are we creating a new competitor? Are we giving away too much proprietary 
knowledge? Will they or can they provide what we agreed on? If this reluctance is apparent in 
the firm’s behavior and interactions with the partner firm, it can be interpreted as distrust. In 
turn the partner firm will reciprocate with distrust in their feelings and behaviors. Obviously, 
such a pattern in the signaling between partners makes trust building difficult. In fact, such 
early signaling may set a cycle of distrust into motion in the relationship. Conversely, by their 
behaviors and interactions in the relationship, partners in the alliance can signal trust of each 
other, thereby setting in motion a positive cycle. Examples include delivering more than 
expected in the exchange, concessions in negotiations, forbearance in the wielding of power 
even if justified, accommodation and flexibility when the partner faces organizational crises. 
. 
In addition, strong information sharing can signal trust and trustworthiness in alliance 
relationships. In related research, interviews with managers showed that trust signaling 
symbols can involve behaviors suggestive of openness and receptivity in communication 
patterns, fairness and discretion in interactions (Butler 1991). Gradually, as each side deals 
repeatedly with their partner, suspicion declines and trust grows reciprocally (Johnson et al., 
1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). This starts a process in which relational norms evolve. 
Relational norms are defined as expectations about behaviour that are shared by a group of 
decision-makers (Heide and John, 1992) and provide guidelines for the initial probes that 
potential exchange partners may make towards each other. Relational norms prescribe 
acceptable behaviour at the onset of inter-organisational partnerships, which, if considered 
equitable by partner firms, eventually lead to future expectations of trust (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, certain scholars have suggested that pronouncements such as 'build 
relationships to create harmony and learning' are fraught with complications owing to the 
inherent contradiction among the different strategic objectives that firms seek in alliances 
(Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). A potential danger in alliance situations is the risk of 
unilaterally losing core proprietary know-how or capabilities to the partner (Hladik, 1988). A 
firm derives its competitive strength from its proprietary assets and will be well aware of the 
danger of about losing them to the alliance partner. Partnerships are fraught with hidden 
agendas driven by the opportunistic desire to access and internalize the partner's core 
proprietary skills much faster than the partner. These 'learning races' often leave a firm in a 
Catch-22 situation: if it contributes too little to building the relationship, the alliance may be 
doomed to fail (Khanna et al., 1998); on the other hand, if it contributes too much and too 
openly, its partner will gain the upper hand (Doz, 1988). Although the transaction cost 
perspective recommends a variety of contractua1 mechanisms to guard against partner 
opportunism, scholars from other perspectives have suggested alternate means for minimizing 
this specific risk. Dyer and Singh (1998) propose alternatives of self-enforcing agreements, 
which are sometimes referred to as 'private ordering' in the economics literature or 'trust' in 
the sociological literature. Sociologists, anthropologists, and lega1 scholars have long argued 
that informal social controls supplement and often supplant forma1 controls (Macaulay, 1963; 
Granovetter, 1985). These self-enforcing agreements rely on relational capita1 as governance 
mechanism and are often a more effective and less costly means of protecting specialized 
investments and proprietary assets (Sako, 1991; Hill, 1995). Relational capital creates a 
. 
mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit others' vulnerabilities even if 
there is an opportunity to do so (Sabel, 1993). This confidence arises out of the social controls 
that such capital creates. 
 
Within this context it is proposed that relational norms as well as social control are important 
determinants of relational capital and success of the alliance. Although a number of different 
overlapping relational norms have been identified in various disciplines, the three norms of 
continuity expectations, flexibility and information exchange are particularly important in 
alliances (Heide and John, 1992; Kumar et al. 1995; Aulakh et al, 1996). 
 
The norm of continuity expectations is the mutual recognition that the relationship will 
continue in the future. As a relational norm of continuity expectations is developed, exchange 
partners achieve a level of satisfaction with the relationship and thus do not look for 
alternative partners (Anderson and  1989, Dwyer et al., 1987). The norm of continuity 
expectations has the effect of encouraging partner firms to perceive co-operation not as a 
means but as an end in itself (Buckley and Casson, 1988). The norm of flexibility in a 
partnership is defined as the willingness to make adjustments as circumstances change (Heide 
and John, 1992). Flexibility is particularly important in relationships because partner firms 
often operate in diverse political, cultural and economic environments, thus making 
relationship adjustments imperative to deal with different and changing environmental 
conditions. Furthermore, partner firms are often called to react to unforeseen changes. Bleeke 
and Ernst (1991) found that partnerships characterised by a high degree of flexibility evolved 
better in the face of unexpected contingencies arising from changes in strategies, skills and 
resources of partner firms. The norm of information exchange in inter-organisational 
partnerships is defined as the formal and informal sharing of meaningful and timely 
information between firms (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Timely information exchange 
between partner firms fosters trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Moorman et al 1993), because 
communication helps to resolve disputes and facilitates the alignment of perceptions and 
expectations (Aulakh et al 1996). Furthermore, the expectations of getting all information on 
an ongoing basis enable firms to cope better with internal processes and external market 
conditions (Heide and John, 1992). Social control refers to an informal control that creates 
organisational context or culture whereby the need for formal measurement of either 
outcomes or behaviours is greatly reduced (Ouchi, 1979). Dalton (1971) suggests that 
informal controls can provide both the implicit rules and supportive structures to facilitate role 
. 
understanding in organisational exchanges. The social identity theory further posits that social 
control in inter-organisational exchanges is conducive to shared beliefs and mutual 
identification by the partner firms (Ashforth and Miles, 1989). Accordingly, in socially 
controlled partnerships monitoring occurs through interpersonal interactions and these 
repeated interactions over time lead to systematise and shared organisational values, which 
help in building trust between partners. The long term economic performance is also 
enhanced through social control. Through the process of socialisation and indoctrination, a 
partnering firm allows wide latitude to the partner firms thus enabling the latter to respond to 
conditions quickly and in a manner consistent with the goals and objectives of the alliance 
(Aulakh, 1996). 
 
Thus, relational capital in the alliance is considered as the quality of the relationship that 
exists between alliance partners. It is through relational capital that the alliance is actually 
enacted and implemented. It facilitates exchange and transfer of information and know-how 
across the alliance interface (Kale et al. 2002). As in all business interactions, the building of 
relational capital depends on the partnering signalling to each other and the interpretation and 
response to this signalling, which requires an alliance capability. It is enhanced by a feedback 
pattern; a trust cycle (Butler, 1995; Zand, 1972). Relational norms and social control are 
important determinants of relational capital and success of the alliance. They enable partner 
firms to respond to conditions quickly and in a manner consistent with the goals and 
objectives of the alliance. 
 
5.  Towards an integrated model 
This study builds on the work of scholars who have stressed the role of trust and personal 
interaction in inter-organizational relationships (Gulati, 1995; Zaheer et al, 1998, Cullen et al. 
2000, Kale et al. 2000) as well as on works of scholars who have stressed the role of alliance 
competence in the success of alliances (Kale et al., 2002 and Lambe et al. 2002). However, it 
is argued that relational capital is linked not only to alliance success in general, but also to 
specific and important objectives such as relational norms and social control. Hence, although 
most literature emphasises structural factors to explain alliance success, this study argues the 
need to pay attention to the interplay between a firm’s alliance capability and relational 
capital. It considers the firm’s alliance capability as a prerequisite for finding, developing and 
managing successful alliances. Where alliance capability contributes to more effectively 
managing each phase of the alliance life cycle, nursing relational capital, relational capital 
. 
based on mutual trust and respect increases the willingness and ability of alliance partners to 
engage in mutual exchange of information, willingness to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions and to perceive co-operation as an end in itself. Moreover, linking both alliance 
capability and relational capital to alliance success is advocated, because studies on alliance 
experience have shown that both do matter (Kale et al, 2002) 
 
Mutual interaction and trust that engender relational capital not only enable partners to work 
more untidily, but also facilitates easier flow of information and skills between them. If all 
firms in the alliance have an alliance capability (joint alliance capability) then they will work 
together more effectively then in an alliance where an asymmetric and unbalanced alliance 
competence exists. In other words an unskilled alliance partner can diminish the ability of the 
alliance partners to work together and make the required resource investments in the alliance 
to create alliance value. As mentioned before, a firm, even one with an alliance capability, 
will have difficulty working on an alliance partner that cannot manage inter-firm cultural 
differences. Hence, it has difficulties co-ordinating activities with another firm that does not 
share control, does not easily share information and fails to necessary investments in the 
alliance (Lambe et al. 2002; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000; Spekman et al. 1999). As a 
consequence it will lack relational capital. Hence, although it might be argued that one 
competent alliance partner can have a positive effect on the other, research indicates that the 
know how required to be a competent alliance partner is complex and requires years of 
alliance experience (Anan and Khanna, 2000; Spekman et al, 1999; Lambe and Spekman, 
1997; Simonin 1997; Day 1995).  
 
Besides having an impact at the firm and dyadic level of alliance partners, relational capital 
and alliance capability can also play a significant role at the industry or network level. Certain 
scholars have argued that strong interpersonal ties among existing partners create a basis for 
larger alliance networks to evolve (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Relational capital that rests 
upon such ties engenders greater trust between partners, thereby inducing them to form more 
alliances with each other in the future. It also allows each partner to form alliances with other 
companies, based on the referrals of trustworthiness that each partner is ready to give for its 
current partners owing the strong relational capital between them. Thus relational capital 
opens up greater opportunities for the firms concerned to form new linkages and 
collaborations with each other and with other companies and thereby increase the network of 
alliances in which they are embedded (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). In addition if 
. 
firms posses an alliance capability they probably have a first mover advantage in bringing the 
best candidates into the alliance (Day, 1995). When all of the firms in an alliance have an 
alliance capability, there is a synergistic benefit that enhances the ability to the alliance to 
work together and to create value (Lambe et al. 2002). These different perspectives are 
conceptualised in figure 1. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It is argued that relational capital and alliance capability are important constructs of alliance 
success. To reveal the interrelation of these constructs and performance provides important 
insight in how to manage inter-organisational relationships more effectively and how to 
strengthen both the strategic position of individual partners and alliance arrangements 
(Geyskens et all, 1999, Lambe et al 2002; Aulakh et al 1996). 
 
While strong relational capital and alliance capability can enhance the leverage and 
coordination within the alliance partners, actual leverage and coordination may differ because 
of different abilities of the concerned partners. Furthermore, relations are connected to other 
relations resulting in systems of interdependent relations. Just like firm’s behaviour and 
performance depends on the behaviour of other firms. Also one should bear in mind that from 
a co-evolutionary perspective (Windler and Sydow, 2002), firms do not act in markets or 
networks conceived as externally given. Rather, firms interact with other firms and thereby 
actualise practices and structures of the respective business network. The development of 
industry and network processes becomes one which should not only be understood as a co-
evolutionary process, but as a co-evolutionary multi-level constitution process (Windler and 
Sydow, 2002). 
 
6. Directions for research 
From a normative point of view, managers are more interested in assessing whether their 
alliances are performing rather than focusing on whether alliance partners have an alliance 
capability and/or the level of relational capital. Therefore it is challenging to assess the 
performance implications of both alliance capability and relational capital. More precise, 
examining how the presence of a firm-level alliance capability is affecting relational capital 
and performance of alliances. This can be illustrated by the following example. Some 
. 
suppliers felt that General Motors had betrayed their trust by allegedly sharing proprietary 
supplier designs with competing suppliers. This has resulted in a competitive advantage for 
Chrysler as automobile suppliers now present their newest designs to Chrysler first rather than 
General Motors. Furthermore, in 1990 Chrysler was ranked lower on trust than Ford Motors 
and General Motors by suppliers. Today, Chrysler ranks higher in supplier trust than its two 
main competitors (Dyer, 1996). This example makes clear the importance of examining the 
position of firms in networks of exchange relationships. Further research could enrich the 
present work on relational capital and alliance capability by considering antecedents and 
consequences located in the alliance‘s embedded network context. Some potentially useful 
constructs that might be related to both are ‘anticipated constructive effects on network 
identity’, ‘anticipated deleterious effects on network identity’ (Anderson et al., 1994), 
‘improved market position’ and ‘improved market relations’ (Haughland and Reve, 1990). 
This provides a guide for predicting and explaining actual outcomes. Hence, conceptualisation  
of the processes that are involved in inter-organisational co-operation and providing more 
detailed analyses of these  processes, their triggers and consequences will contribute to our 
knowledge  about the outcomes of inter-organisational co-operation and their relevant 
contingencies and explanations of why particular antecedents associate with specific 
outcomes (Oliver and Ebers, 1998). In a more general perspective several lines of research 
can be indicated for studies of relationships. There are five groups of factors to consider, 
evolving from a firm’s perspective towards a network perspective: a) characteristics of the 
relationships and interactions in which a firm is involved; b) characteristics of a firm’ 
relationship partners; c) characteristics of connected relations and their interactions; d) 
characteristics of a firm’s network position and e) characteristics of the network as a whole. In 
order to investigate the impact of these factors on firm, relationship and network behaviour 
and performance, different types of research designs and approaches are needed to 
compliment existing perspectives in relationship and network studies. Studies of relationships 
are usually based on samples of independent relations and firms, but to study the impact of 
connected relations and firms samples of connected relations and firms are required. For 
example, to study the impact of relationships and other network members one need to identify 
and measure the characteristics of a firm most important relationships and relationship 
partners, as Blankenburg-Holm et al. (1996, 1999) have demonstrated the significant impact 
of connected relations on relationship performance. However, existing models of buyer-seller 
relations tend to study dyads separated from any network context, including only a 
comparison with an alternative and other types of connections not included (Wilkinson and 
. 
Young, 2002). Network analysis methods exist to derive measures of various network 
characteristics and an individual firm’s position in the network. These can be used to develop 
hypotheses and to predict the behaviour and performance of firms and relations in the 
networks. Only a few such studies have been carried out of the structure, evolution and 
behaviour of networks as a whole, however they are time consuming and difficult to carry out. 
An alternative approach is to simulate models of networks as complex adaptive systems and 
examine their behaviour and development under different conditions. Agent-based modelling 
and simulations techniques have been developed. These models are different from simulation 
models used in the past to study markets and networks. There is no controlling program, the 
rules governing behaviour can change in response to behaviour taking place and structure 
emerges in a bottom-up way. Such models can be used to explore how large-scale (macro) 
order is shaped by the characteristics of local interaction (micro) interactions, how different 
patterns of local interaction and firm adaptive behaviour impact on overall network behaviour 
and performance; the extent to which similar network behaviour and performance can emerge 
from different patterns of local interaction strategies and adaptive behaviour; and the impact 
and limits of types of intervention strategies on network behaviour and evolution (including 
attempts to shape local interaction patterns (Wilkinson and Young, 2002). 
 
Hence, more integrative approaches are encouraged to understand and explain alliance 
success better, because many studies are limited by their unilateral approach and reliance on 
firm level measures of alliance success. From prior research is known that important dyadic or 
transaction-level attributes such as governance structures (Kogut, 1989), information 
asymmetries (Reuer and Koza, 2000), level of inter-partner trust (Kale et al., 2000), etc. also 
have an impact on alliance success (Kale et al., 2002). Also there is a need for longitudinal 
studies involving the same set of alliances over an extended period. Such research would 
make a great contribution to the process of dynamics and the cumulative effects of individual 
exchange episodes in establishing long-term relationships. This would make possible better 
inferences about the development on alliance constructs over time, their causal sequence and 
feedback effects. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper aims to show how a firm’s alliance capability and relational capital might 
contribute to alliance success. Both the role of alliance capability and relational capital are 
discussed. A firm’s alliance capability might be considered as a prerequisite for finding, 
. 
developing and managing alliances, thereby, facilitating the development of relational capital. 
The latter can be seen as the ability to engage in mutual exchange of information, willingness 
to adapt to changing environmental conditions and to perceive co-operation as an end in itself. 
Both firms and alliances can benefit substantially by possessing and managing alliance 
capability and relational capital as aspects of alliance management. However, firms are quite 
heterogeneous with respect to their alliance capabilities and as a consequence heterogeneous 
in their ability to develop relational capital. This heterogeneity is linked both to the amount of 
prior alliance experience they have had (Anand and Khanna, 2000) and how they learn and 
leverage from that experience (Kale and Singh, 1999). In assessing the success of alliances 
this is of great importance, especially when competition is shifting towards group versus 
group competition. Hence, to study this requires samples of connected relations and firms and 
dyadic data-gathering, as well as a network perspective. Future research is challenged to 
explore these important research issues in greater detail.  
 
. 
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Figure 1: The presumed effects of alliance capability (ac) and relational capital (rc) on success at the firm-
, alliance and network level.                          
ac firm X=Y=Z=U>V>W>P>Q>R; ac firm V=W=P>Q>R; ac firm Q=R. Rc alliance A>B>C 
competitiveness and attractiveness allianc A>B>C. Double arrow: mutual attractive; single arrow: one 
sided attractiveness. 
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